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Rent-Seeking Behaviors of Farm Workers and Effects on Profitability of Palm Oil Production Business: Evidence from Nigeria

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Abstract

The effect of primitive and negative rent seeking impulse of farm workers on profitability has stimulated much debates in Nigeria yet it has not received sufficient empirical investigations. There is need for more clarity and deeper understanding of rent seeking behaviour and how it affects the profits of farm business organizations. This study evaluates the effect of rent seeking behaviours on profitability of oil palm plantation under lease in Delta State, Nigeria. Quantitative and qualitative primary data were used for the study. Validated structured questionnaire was the instrument used to collect data from randomly selected 160 operators of oil palm lease business in Delta State, Nigeria. Collected data were analysed using parametric and non-parametric statistics. Descriptive statistical tools used were mean, percentage, standard deviation and coefficient of variation. The inferential statistics used were t-statistic and F-statistic in multiple regression analysis. The modern lease type which involves written agreement with legal documentation (98.1%) was the most common lease practice. The net return on investment (ROI) 0.38. The most evident rent-seeking behaviour were lobbying (98.12%), theft (98.12%) and tax evasion (96.25%) with a rent seeking index of 85%. The R^2 value of multiple regression result shows that rent seeking behaviours explain 57% variation in the profitability of oil palm farm, contracts. The most significant rent seeking variables were lobbing and theft. Further result (R^2 = 50%) showed that rent seeking behaviours explained 50% variability in the productivity of oil palm farm contracts. Double payment for farm resources turned out to exert the most significant negative influence on the productivity of oil palm lease contracts. Installation of Close-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras at palm oil processing plants and regular auditing were recommended.

Keywords: *Rent-Seeking Behaviours, Farm Workers, Profitability, Productivity, Oil Palm Farms.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Oil palm is an economical and important agricultural crop globally. It is a very efficient crop in terms of input utilization (De Vries et al 2019). It accounts for 33% of total global edible oil (Food and Agriculture organization (FAO 2018). With an increasing world population and growing demand for palm oil, an estimated 12million hectares will be needed over the next 25years (Corley, 2009).

Agricultural productivity according to Hussain and Perera (2004) has being explained by many factors which include land, climatic factors, water and water management, input application such as fertilizers, herbicides and labour, socioeconomic factors such as farmers health status years of experience, farm size, tenancy terms, land fragmentation credit and technology. Of all the available literature on farm productivity, no study has captured rent

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seeking behavior as a determinant of productivity of agricultural contracts hence the present study.

Georgiev (2010), investigated rent- seeking in agricultural contracts in Bulgaria and found out that institutional conditions are reasons for existence of rent seekers, they avail themselves of the non-market benefits, such as monopoly in the course of ordinary activities, opportunities to secure profit from duplication of routine, administrative activities and functions, created legal obstacles before other participants in order to enjoy monopoly of profit. All these lead to certain business losses, which can be measured by transaction costs of operating agricultural contracts.

A conducive environment and government intervention or interest are factors that have contributed to the resurgence of the oil palm industry in Nigeria (Akhaine, 2017). Oil palm has the potential if optimally harnessed, to transform the Nigerian economy..

Nigeria is considered to be among the largest producers of oil palm with a total annual production of 1.34m tonnes. Before the discovery of crude oil, the Nigerian economy benefited from mainly from oil palm export and global lease in export (Biodun *et al.*, 2021). Apart from its edible use, palm oil is an industrial primary raw material. Today, oil palm production sector is under construction after it failed due to crude oil discovery (Biodun *et al*., 2021).

Nigeria remains the largest producer of oil palm in Africa till date. Although it ranks 5th in the world behind Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Columbia, Nigeria accounts for only 1.5% or 1.034 metric tons of total world output (Price Water House Coopers analysis, 2018).

The oil palm industry in Delta state is very fragmented largely due to the land tenure challenges. The industry is characterised by numerous small-holder farms which accounts for over 80% of local production using approximately 1.6 million hectares of land (USDA/NRS 2018).

Area expansion raises concern on environmental impacts such as forest destruction and loss of biodiversity (Griffiths *et al.,* 2002). Alternatively increasing productivity in already existing plantations offers scope for improvement and reduces the need to increase land area for oil palm production. Financial returns through yield intensification are expected to be larger because there is no need to invest in new planting and plantation infrastructure. In addition, financial returns are expected to develop more rapidly, because production starts to increase as soon as agronomic constraints are removed (Donough *et al.,* 2009).

Despite the myriad of challenges, the oil Palm Industry is still thriving and capable of transforming the Nigerian economy if properly harnessed.

The operators are usually tenants who rent these plantations from the owners. In spite of its prevalence in the oil palm industry, there is little known fact on the lease contracts and its operations in Delta State, Nigeria.

Oil Palm plantation lease contract has to do with a contractual framework or agreement between the lessor (Plantation Owner) and lessee (The Tenant). Under this agreement, it is assumed that the leasee retains the right to own, operate and maintain the plantation for a fee and for specific period. In the course of past decades, high prices of CPO have induced rapid economic development/activities in the oil palm sub-sector with rapid improvement in participants wellbeing through increased income. Delta State ranks among the highest in oil palm production in Nigeria. It is grown across the State, predominately in the rain forest zone of Delta State (i.e., Warri-North, Ethiope-East, Ethiope-West, Ika North East, Ika South,

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Aniocha South and Aniocha North). One practice that has sustained the oil palm industry until now, is plantation lease arrangement or contract farming arrangement between harvesters and plantation owners with profit motive. It is a common assumption that (corruption) rent seeking behaviour could render the contract unprofitable or unproductive.

Rent seeking is a primitive or negative wealth acquisition impulse (Orubu, 2013) other than being the reward due to the ownership of land or other natural resources

Although the oil palm plantation lease/contract is an aged-long practise in Delta State, Nigeria, its operation has not been clearly examined and understood. For example, the cost and returns that determine investment decisions of stakeholders, deserves critical analysis. Furthermore, the evidence of rent seeking behaviours that influence profitability of oil palm farms under lease/contract needs to be established. Profit is the bottom line of every business. It is capable of driving development in oil palm industry.

Diversification of the economy from crude oil will require more investment in the oil palm industry in Nigeria. Identifying rent-seeking behaviours such as (lobbying, theft, double payment, tax evasion and other corrupt practices) and addressing them through relevant policy mechanisms will improve the profitability in the oil palm industry in Nigeria.

With improved profitability, more investment will be attracted to oil industry. Although rent seeking behaviours are perceived inhibitors to profitability and resource productivity in the palm oil industry in Nigeria, their effects have not been fully investigated. The outcome of this research will be of benefits to stakeholders in oil palm industry.

This study will help to enlighten investors both in oil palm plantation and tenants and it will provide proper guide as to making decision, it will equally help policy makers in helping to regulate and institutionalize lease contract in oil palm plantation.

1.1 Research Objectives

The broad objective of the study was to assess the effect of rent seeking behaviour on profitability of oil palm plantation under lease/contract in Delta State, Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study were to:

i) Describe how the oil palm farm lease/contract is operated;

ii) Determine the cost and returns in oil palm plantations under lease/ contract;

iii) Ascertain the index of existence of primitive rent-acquisition impulse (rent seeking behaviour) such as lobbying, theft, corruption, tax evasion, double payment, institutional/market failure, concentration of participants and poverty among farm employees;

iv) Evaluate the relationship between rent seeking behaviours and profitability of oil palm plantation under lease;; and;

v) Identify economic policy options that can tackle rent-seeking behaviour in the oil palm sub-sector.

1.2 Hypothesis

H01: There is no significant relationship between rent seeking behaviour and profitability of oil palm enterprise under lease/contract.

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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Profitability Theory

The functional theory of profit regards profit as a reward for a factor of production. Secondly the rent theory of profit regards profit as a residual income or as excess of price over costs. The institutional theory emphasizes unearned nature of profit as monopoly profit (Shailesh 2020). The seven theories of profit are:

- Rent Theory of Profit: states that profit is the rent of superior entrepreneur over marginal or less efficient entrepreneur.
- Wage Theory of Profit; profit is the wage of the entrepreneur which accrues to him on account of his ability
- Risk Theory of Profit; profit is the reward for risk-taking in business. Risk-taking is supposed to be the most important function of an entrepreneur.
- The Dynamic Theory of Profit; profit is the difference between the price and the cost of production of the commodity.
- Schumpeter's Innovation Theory; profit is the reward for innovations.
- Uncertainty Bearing Theory of Profit; profit is a reward for risk-taking.
- Marginal Productivity Theory of Profit; profits are equal to the marginal worth of the entrepreneur and are determined by the marginal productivity of the entrepreneur. When the marginal productivity is high, profits will be high.

Profit = Sp – Cp (Selling price minus Cost price).

Profit is a financial benefit that is realized when the amount of revenue gained from business activity exceeds the expenses, cost and taxes in sustaining the activity in question. (Investopedia year). It is calculated as total revenue less total expenses of a business.

A plantation under lease contract can be said to be profitable only if the operating the plantation after meeting the lease and operating obligation still has surplus.

Queer Ladder Theory (QLT)

This study also adopted Queer Ladder Theory (QLT). The origin of Queer Ladder Theory (QLT) is associated with an American sociologist, Daniel Bell (1919-2011), who coined the idea of „queer ladder" in an attempt to explain the instrumental essence of organized crime as a desperate means of socio-economic empowerment and unwholesome/illegitimate climbing of wealth ladder.

The basic assumptions of QLT are; organized crime is an instrumental behavior, it is a means to an end; it is an instrument of social climbing and/or socioeconomic advancement; and it is a measure to accumulate wealth.

Analytical Framework

Multiple regression theory

Behind every economic relationship, there is a random disturbance factor, which exists as variable of unknown origin (Orubu, 2013)

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Conceptual Framework

Corruption, Theft and Tax Evasion are various profit driven offences, traditional criminology has focus almost exclusively on the who and the why and the new situational and script approach on the how Naylor, (2003). To date there has been little research conducted on rent-seeking behaviour in agricultural production.

3. MATERIALS AND METHODS

3.1 Study Area

The study was carried out in Delta State of Nigeria. This area is chosen for the study because of its evergreen forest with many oil-palm trees for industrial and household consumption. Its coordinates are 5°30'N 5°59'E / 5°.500'N 5°.983'E and it has an altitude of 27m.

The Climate is equatorial, marked with two distinct seasons; the dry season (Nov - Dec) and rainy season (April -Oct). It has an average monthly temperature of 28°C. The study area has rain forests, swamps, and long network of streams and creeks.

The major occupations predominant among the people are; oil palm production and processing into palm oil, fishing, arable crop farming and trading.

3.2 Sampling Techniques

In this study, multi-stage sampling procedure was used to compose the sample for the research as follows:

Stage 1- Purposive selection of four LGAs:

Out of the 25 LGAs, 4 LGAs were purposively selected based on their level of involvement in oil palm plantation and processing which were identified during a reconnaissance survey. The LGAs selected are Ethiope East, Ethiope West, Ika North East and Aniocha South respectively. Reason for the selection is based on the fact that there are more plantations and processors in these Local Government Areas compared with others which mainly focus their agricultural activities on cassava production and fish farming.

Stage 2- Purposively selection of 160 respondents:

From the 4 LGAs, at least 5 communities were purposively selected, which gave a minimum of 20 communities. The reason for this selection was because of the population of oil palm plantations in the communities. Out of the 20 communities, at least 8 respondents were chosen which gives a total of 160 respondents (Lessee).

The reason for this was because majority of the operators who are lessee can provide information on the lessor rent seeking behaviour.

3.3 Method of Data Collection

Primary data were collected for the purpose of this study from related respondents in the study area using structured questionnaire and interview schedule. These techniques were complemented by observation (participant) method. The use of interview schedule was employed to allow for proper interaction with respondents so as to get detailed information which could not be presented in questionnaire. The instrument (questionnaire) were subjected to validity test and reliability test. This was achieved by paying visits to small scale oil palm plantation operators and observable features were noted. The questionnaire contains questions

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relating to specific objective of the study such as rent seeking behaviour, cost of production and productivity. The features of the oil palm plantation; age of operational existence, type of ownership, sources of funds, method of processing technique, no of employees, type of labour, no of fresh fruit bunches processed per day, age of operators, educational level. Information were also collected on cost of operation, net profit return and constraints faced by the industry.

3.4 Methods of Data Analysis

Objective 1: describe the lease contract system in oil palm plantation study area

The data were collected based on features of the small-scale palm oil extraction firms and were analyzed using descriptive statistical tools, such as mean, mode, frequency distribution table and percentage.

Objective 2: Ascertain the cost and return analysis of lease contract of oil palm plantation

Objective 3: Analyze the Net Return on Investment (Strength) in traditional and semi-modern palm oil extraction firms in the study area.

The information used was collected in form of enterprise budget directly from the palm oil extraction firms. In measuring the return on investment, the study made use of ROI formula:

$$\mathbf{ROI = T\frac{R - TC}{T C} \times \frac{100}{1}} \quad \text{---------- eqn (4)}$$

Where;

ROI = return on investment of oil palm plantation under lease contract

TR = Total Revenue of oil palm plantation under lease contract

TC = Total Cost of oil palm plantation under lease contract

Model 1: examine the effect of rent-seeking behaviour on profitability of oil palm plantation under lease.

The Multiple Regression Model will be used to establish relationship between rent-seeking behaviour and profitability of oil palm plantation under lease. The implicit form of the model is specified as:

Profitability = f(Rent-Seeking Behaviour Parameters**)**

Where;

$\mathbf{PT} = \boldsymbol{f}\mathbf{(L, T, C, TE, DP)} + \boldsymbol{\mu}$ ---------- eqn (17)

Where;

PT_i = Profitability (Return on Investment)

L= Lobbying; T = Theft; C= Corruption; TE = Tax Evasion; DP = Double Payment

μ = Disturbance term

The above model was explicitly specified in linear form;

Linear Function: $\mathbf{PT_i} = \beta_o + \beta_1 L + \beta_2 T + \beta_3 C + \beta_4 TE + \beta_5 DP + \boldsymbol{\mu}$ eqn (18)

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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Socio – Economic Characteristics of Respondents

The Socio-economic characteristic studied were age, gender, marital status, household size, education level, mode of operation, farm size, palm stands/plantation under lease and number of workers engaged by the leasee. These are presented in table 2 and discussed in the following subsections.

- ✓ **Distribution of Oil Palm respondents (lease) by age:** Table 2 shows that the age distribution of respondent which shows that practitioner (leasee) below the of 35 years accounted for 5.6% while those between the age range of 36 and 45 accounted for 65.6% respondents while those above 46 accounted 28.8 percent.

  The mean age was 41yrs. This implies that the participants in oil palm plantation lease business are in the active age of productivity. The result is consistent with report of Balari, Ugbe and Tijani (2015) highly innovative and adoptive.

- ✓ **Distribution of Respondent by Gender:** The result in (Table 2) indicate that 53.2% of respondent female while 46.8 male. This implies that majority of oil palm lease operators (leasee) are female in the study area. The result of the study is consistent with land tenure system in the study as the land tenure does not favour women owing large portions of land to support palm production. It must be noted that women in the area are very industrious and have become less dependent on their spouses.

- ✓ **Marital Status of Respondents**: Table 2 indicate that, majority of respondent 77.5% were married while single accounted for 22.5% the business of oil palm plantation lease. Married women take advantage of partnering with their spouses who act as both financial and latent partners. This result is well aligned with the earlier report of Ifejika, Akinbife, et al (2008) which stated that high population of rural farmers were married. Marriage is correlated with stability and risk bearing in a bid to meet family needs and advancement of wellbeing operation of oil palm plantation lease is likely a leeway to improve or enhanced standard of living of married persons.

- ✓ **Household Size Respondent:** The household size distribution of the respondents as shown (table 2) indicates 55% had family size of between 4-6 persons which family size of 1-3 accounted for 20% another 20% was recorded for family size 7-9 while only 5% represented family size of 10 above. Findings shows that respondents had relative large family. The result agrees with Onubu (2012) who stated that higher household size makes for availability of family labour in arresting labour constraints.

- ✓ **Level of Education:** Table 2 indicates that only 8.1% of operators had no formal education which 91.9% have varying education level with tertiary education leading the 56% while primary and secondary education accounts 3.8% and 32% respectively. This result indicate that education plays a role in the improvement of lively hood. It improves an individual ability to identify and evaluate investment opportunity through implied decision making and expose cheap source of funding which is major set base for operators as the cost of lease must be fully taken care of before lease can more into plantation in most cases. This finding showed that respondents were literate.

- ✓ **Mode of Operation:** Table 2 showed that 59% of respondent were on full time while 41% were on part time.

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- ✓ **Farm Size (Hectares):** Table 2 indicate that farm size ranging between 1-10 hectare accounts 43% which represents the modal class while classes 1-5 and 11-15 represents 20% of respondents respectively.
- ✓ **Numbers of Oil Palm Stand:** From table 4.1 operators who own the right to 1000-1500 stands dominate with 29% closely followed by 1501-2000 at 19%. Those ›500 and 500-1000 accounts for 13% and 16% respectively. The range of oil palm stand between 2001-2500 accounted for 8% and 4000 and above 6%.
- ✓ **Number of Workers:** The Number of workers is distributed amongst respondents in table 2 indicates that between 1-3 workers represented 65% while 4-6 accounted for 31% only 4% of respondents had 7 workers and above. The result implies that mean workers was 2.

Table 2: Description of oil palm lease/contract

Variable	Freq. (x)	Percentage	Mean/Mode
Type of Oil Palm Lease Practices			
(i) Traditional Lease Practice	15	9.3	
(ii) Modern Lease Practice	145	90.7	Modern Lease System
Total	**160**	**100**	
Evidence of Official Written Agreement			
(i) Traditional Lease Practice	12	7.5	
(ii) Modern Lease Practice	148	92.5	Modern Lease System
Total	**160**	**100**	
Evidence of Legal Documentation			
(i) Traditional Lease Practice	3	1.9	
(ii) Modern Lease Practice	157	98.1	Modern Lease System
Total	**160**	**100**	
Duration of Oil Palm Lease Practice			
(i) 1 – 3yrs	121	76.00	
(ii) 4 – 6yrs	21	13.00	1-3 years
(iii) 7yrs and above	18	11.00	
Total	**160**	**100**	
Pricing Terms			
(i) By land area (₦/Ha)	9	5.6	By number of trees
(ii) By number of trees (₦/Tree)	151	94.4	
Total	**160**	**100**	

Source: *Field Survey, 2021*

Table 3: Cost and Returns of Oil Palm Contract

S/N	Items	Amount (N)	% of Total Revenue
1	Total Cost	3.452,781	72%
2	Total Revenue	4,767,947	100
3	Net Return	1,315,166	38.1
4	Cost Per Oil Palm Tree	1,973	0.041
5	Net Return Per Oil Palm Tree	751.5	0.016
6	Net Return on Investment	0.389	
7	% ROI	38.1%	

Source: *Field Survey, 2021*

Table 3 presents the analysis of cost and returns in oil palm farm contracts in the study area. The result in Table 3 shows that average total cost of transaction in oil palm farm was ₦3,452,781. This implies that 72% of total revenue (₦4,767,947) accounted for total cost of farm operation. About 38% of total revenue accounted for net profit (₦1,315,166). This result

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implies that oil palm farm lease business is profitable and every ₦100 invested in it will translate to a profit of ₦38.

Table 4: Rent Seeking Index:

S/N	Rent Seeking Indicators	Freq. (x)	Percentage	C.V = $\frac{\alpha}{N} x \frac{100}{1}$
1	Lobbying	157	98.12	13.86
2	Theft	157	98.12	13.86
3	Corruption	148	92.50	28.56
4	Tax Evasion	154	96.25	19.79
5	Inflating Transaction Cost	139	81.25	48.18
6	High Number of Contract Bidders/Institutional Environment	67	40.49	96.70

Source: *Field Survey, 2021*

Rent Seeking Index

$$RSI = \frac{\Sigma x}{N(Rsr)} x \frac{100}{1}$$

$$= \frac{813}{960} x \frac{100}{1}$$

$$RSI = 85\%$$

Table 5 shows the result of rent-seeking indicators in oil palm lease business. The result shows that lobbying (98.12%), theft (98.12%), tax evasion (96.25%) is the most common rent seeking behaviour in oil palm lease business. The clear evidence of lobbying and theft is supported by the very low coefficient of variation (C.V) of 13.86% and 13.86% respectively. This low coefficient of variation indicates that they are the widespread rent-seeking behaviours in oil palm farms under lease.

This result is supported by the relatively high rent seeking index (RSI) of 85%. The result is supported by the earlier report of Georgier (2010) who found out that rent seekers in agricultural contracts avail themselves of non-market benefits through corrupt practices to secure un-earned income. This has the tendency to increase the transaction cost of operating agricultural contracts which ultimately would reduce profit.

Table 5: Effect of Rent Seeking Behaviour on Profitability

Rent Seeking Behaviour	Coefficients	Std Error	T-Ratio	P.Value
(Constant)	8.083	.579	13.958	.000
Lobbying	-1.224	.298	-4.109	.000*
Theft	-3.145	.977	-3.219	.002*
Corruption	.313	.336	.931	.354
Tax Evasion	.581	.191	3.048	.003*
Inflating Transaction Cost	-.156	.194	-.802	.424
High Number of Contract	-.580	.150	-3.858	.000*
Bidders/Institutional Environment	-.041	.731	-.056	.955
Restriction	.560	.610	.981	.360
Monopolistic Tendency				
Double Payment	-.502	.434	-1.156	.250
F-Ratio	13.328			
R^2	.511(51%)			

Source: *Field Survey, 2021*

* = Significant at 1%

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Table 5 shows the multiple regression result on the effect of rent seeking behaviour on the profitability of oil palm plantation under lease. The linear functional form was chosen as the lead model on the basis of the R^2 values and number of significant variables. The F-Ratio value of 13.33 indicates that the model is significant at 5%. The R^2 value (51%) is the coefficient of determination. This shows that the identified rent seeking indicators explain 51% variation in the profitability derived by leasee of oil palm plantation in the study area. Out of the ten rent-seeking behaviours in the model, four were significant at α=5%.

Lobbying: From Table 4.5, lobbying with a T-ratio value of -4.109 has a negative impact on the profitability of the oil palm lease business in the study area. The study shows that for every ₦100 profit in the business, there is ₦4.1 loss due to lobbying.

Theft: The multiple regression result also shows that there is a negative and significant relationship between theft and profitability. The study showed that theft has a negative effect on profitability in oil palm business. This implies that a 1% increase in theft would reduce profitability of oil palm farm contract by 3.1%.

High number of contract bidders / Institutional Environment: The multiple regression result for Table 4.5 shows that there a negative significant relationship between high number of contract bidders / institutional environment and profitability with a T-Ratio of -3.858. The study showed that there is negative relationship between effect of high number of contract bidders / institutional environment.

Tax Evasion: The multiple regression analysis result in Table 4.5 showed that tax evasion and profitability of oil palm lease and rent seeking behavior of tax evasion has a positive significant relationship with a T-ratio of 3.048. The study findings showed that tax evasion has a positive impact on profitability of oil palm lease. Although tax evasion contributes to profit of agricultural contract, it is a corrupt practice to avoid tax payment to government according to Georgier, (2010).

Inflation of transaction cost, restriction, double payment, corruption and monopolistic tendency where insignificant at α = 5%

CONCLUSION

The study examined rent seeking behaviours and effects on profitability of oil palm under lease/contract in Delta State, Nigeria. We have sufficient evidence to draw the following conclusions from the study:

1. The existence of rent-seeking behaviours such as, lobbying, theft and double payment were obvious features of oil palm farm under lease/contract in Delta State, Nigeria.
2. Rent seeking behaviours are strong determinants of profitability of oil palm under lease/contract in Delta State.
3. Farm managers' lapses are the causes of the existence of rent seeking behaviour in oil palm farms under lease/contracts.
4. The study has established that rent seeking behaviour increases transaction cost of operating agricultural contracts thus reducing profitability.

Arresting rent-seeking behaviours through affective economic policy options. Rent seeking behaviour and its management among farm workers is expected to improve the

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productivity of oil palm farm business. is hope to improve the profitability of oil palm lease contract in Delta State, Nigeria.

Recommendations

1. Oil palm plantation lease business is a profitable business, government at all levels are enjoined to establish oil palm plantation and lease same to the unemployed youths in Delta State.
2. Communities with available land to partner with investors for leasing to individual farmers.
3. Government should formulate deliberate economic policy mechanism to register all oil palm plantations under lease so as to be able to harvest taxes from both the leasor and the leasee. This will go a long way to discourage tax evasion that pervade oil palm lease business in Delta State.
4. To arrest the incidents of theft which is a major rent-seeking behaviour, the leases should during harvesting, beef up security around plantation and install Close Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras in the processing plant to ensure vigilance.
5. Government should increase enlightenment programme on oil palm lease/contract for women operators to enhance efficiency and increase productivity.

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